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L INTRODUCTION

In the United States, both the initial development of the doctrine of
corporate criminal liability and the evolution of its use reflect a
utilitarian and pragmatic view of criminal law. Corporate criminal
liability developed in response to the Industrial Revolution and the rise
of the scope and importance of corporate activities. In the federal
system, the formative period for the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability was the early twentieth century.' During this period, Congress
responded to the unprecedented concentration of economic power in
corporations by dramatically expanding the reach of federal law. 2 This
expansion also addressed business concerns as well as new hazards to
public health and safety.3 Criminal liability for corporations, in addition
to individual liability, was deemed necessary to make critical new
regulatory schemes effective. 4
Prosecutorial policies and corporate sentencing guidelines have
reshaped the implementation of the law. The United States Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the United States Sentencing Commission
(Sentencing Commission) have taken a pragmatic and utilitarian
approach in developing prosecutorial policies and sentencing
guidelines for corporations. These prosecutorial and sentencing
practices seek to reduce or eliminate the negative effects of imposing
criminal liability while exploiting the law's power to deter criminal
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1. Infra Part II.
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behavior, improve corporate citizenship, and bring about beneficial
structural reforms.5 Both the prosecutorial policies and the sentencing
guidelines focus on corporate culpability. 6 This blunts the force of
criticisms that respondeat superior liability is unrelated to true
culpability. This focus on culpability in charging and sentencing also
creates incentives for changes in corporate conduct. Corporations now
have powerful incentives to perform internal investigations, cooperate
with both regulators and prosecutors, and actively pursue settlement
of claims of misconduct. To avoid criminal liability, corporations also
enter into deferred prosecution agreements that often require changes
in corporate business practices and governance, as well as monitoring,
to ensure compliance.
The most recent chapter in the development of corporate criminal
liability reflects not only a pragmatic attempt to craft procedures
adapted to the special challenges of investigating and prosecuting
corporate wrongdoing, but also the influence of public opinion. In
2015, the DOJ announced a new policy on individual accountability for
corporate wrongdoing-articulated in a Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates-which reiterated the importance of
prosecuting individuals, as well as corporations, and announced
changes in prosecutorial practices.7 Many saw the Yates Memo as a
response to criticism that the DOJ had failed to prosecute individual
wrongdoing in the corporate setting.8 The DOJ's explanation of the
Yates Memo included not only utilitarian and pragmatic justifications,
but also multiple references to both the public's confidence in the
system and the need for equal justice.9 Most of the commentary has
assessed the Yates Memo in pragmatic terms, considering the practical
problems it may pose as well as the more fundamental questions of
whether it will deter more corporate misconduct and change corporate
culture. 10 These are critical issues, but the references to public opinion
5. Infra Part III.
6. Id.
7. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, To Heads
of Dep't Components & All U.S. Attorneys, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing
(Sept. 9, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter
Yates Memo]. The Yates Memo has now been incorporated into the United States Attorneys'
Manual.

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL

at 9-27.220,

available at

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220
[hereinafter USAM]; see infra Part II(A) (discussing the USAM).
8. See infra Part IV(A) (discussing the public demand for individual accountability).
9. See infra Part IV(B) (discussing the need for deterrence and reform of corporate
wrongdoing and the influence of public policy concerns about a fair system and equal justice).
10. See, e.g., Gary G. Grindler & Laura K. Bennett, True Cooperation: DOJ's "Reshaped
Conversation"and Its Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2015, at 32, 33, 37-41 (explaining why
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and equal justice raise another intriguing question: how much should
prosecutorial policy reflect public opinion in a democratic system?
This Article puts the Yates Memo into its historic context, arguing
that it carries forward the pragmatic and utilitarian approach that has
characterized the development and implementation of corporate
criminal liability, but also adds something new. The new element is
acknowledgement that individual accountability serves two functions.
First, in tandem with corporate responsibility, individual accountability
serves utilitarian functions. But regardless of any deterrent effect or
stimulus for reform of corporate practices, the Yates Memo also
recognizes the public demand for individual accountability and
prosecutorial policies that give no preferential treatment to whitecollar offenders. This Article concludes with brief comments on the
relationship between prosecutorial policies and public opinion.
IL THE PRAGMATIC AND UTILITARIAN ORIGINS OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY

The seminal case in the development of federal criminal law is
New York Central& Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,11 decided

in 1909. The case reflects a utilitarian and pragmatic employment of
criminal law by both Congress and the Supreme Court during a period
of major social and economic change. The unprecedented
concentration of economic power in corporations and combinations of
business concerns (called "trusts") that developed after the Civil War
produced a demand for new laws-including criminal laws-to
respond effectively to increasingly powerful corporate entities. As one
scholar noted, "Given the absence of widespread public civil
enforcement prior to the early 1900s, corporate criminal liability
appears to have been the only available option that met both the need

&

requiring companies to build cases against individual can be problematic, especially when
relevant evidence is located in foreign jurisdictions where privacy or labor laws limit a
corporation's ability to disclose employees' names or provide certain evidence); Elizabeth E. Joh
Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar
Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 53 (2015) (expressing concern that the Yates Memo may not
increase individual charges because "harmful conduct is often caused by the acts of multiple
agents who lack criminal intent and are unaware of each other's acts"); Katelyn Polantz, DOJ's
'Yates
Memo'
Goes
Too
Far,
Former Deputy
AG
Says,
NAT'L
L.J.
(2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202743031700?keywords=Polantz&publication=Natio
nal+Law+Journal (stating former Deputy Attorney General James Cole's view that the Yates
Memo's "all-or-nothing approach . . will prove to be impractical").
11. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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for public enforcement and the need for corporate liability." 12 This
period saw the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,13
the Elkins Act of 1903,14 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,15
which was the first federal statute to limit cartels and monopolies. 16
Like the Elkins Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to both natural
and corporate persons.1 7
The Elkins Act was Congress' response to the Interstate Commerce
Commission's (ICC) claim that the absence of corporate criminal
sanctions was a fatal flaw in critical regulatory legislation.1 8 The ICC
argued that allowing the imposition of criminal fines directly on the
railroads was critically important for several reasons.1 9 First, when the
violations benefitted only the railroad, but not its officers and agents,
the public-including possible jurors-was likely to disfavor
convicting individual defendants regardless of the strength of the
evidence. 20 Second, when the corporation-the real beneficiary of a
criminal violation-"not only goes unpunished, but is adjudged
incapable of criminal wrongdoing," the law is effectively nullified and
brought into "general discredit." 21 Finally, in some cases, individual

12. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1486 (1996) (footnotes omitted). See also Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 353 (2003) ("[B]y the early 1900s, legislators and judges realized that
the criminal law required modification to properly account for wrongs committed by increasingly
powerful and prevalent corporate collectives.").
13. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (repealed, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 501-507, 522,
523, 525, 526, 20102, 20502-20505, 20902, 21302, 21304, 31505-31504).
14. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903).
15. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004)).
16. There is considerable scholarly debate about the precise concerns that motivated
Congress to pass the Sherman Antitrust Act; some scholars identified the principal concern as
arresting the transfer of wealth from consumers to "price fixers and monopolists" or protecting
"non-consumer interest groups, such as small firms and farmers." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 58-61 (4th ed. 2011).

17. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 8 (defining "person" to include U.S. corporations and
associations (this definition now appears in 15 U.S.C. § 7)). Section 1 expressly provided for the
imposition of felony penalties on a corporation for entering into combinations, trusts, or other
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Id. § 1 (establishing that contracts, trusts, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade were felonies). The original act set the maximum punishment at a fine not
exceeding five-thousand dollars and imprisonment of one year. As amended, Section 1 now
provides for punishment by a fine not exceeding one hundred million dollars for a corporation,
and imprisonment for up to ten years and a fine not exceeding one million dollars for an
individual. Id.
18. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903). As early as 1891, the ICC urged Congress to
provide for corporate criminal liability. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, S.

Misc. Doc. No. 52-31, at 16 (1st Session) (1892). Noting that the federal courts had held that
corporations could not be prosecuted for criminal violations under the Interstate Commerce Act,
the ICC argued that it was "defective at an important point" requiring immediate correction. Id.
19. S. Misc. Doc. No. 52-31, at 16.
2 0. Id.
2 1. Id.
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prosecutions were infeasible because of the difficulty of identifying any
particular employee who was responsible. 22 In response to these calls
for stronger legislation, Congress enacted the Elkins Act, which created
corporate criminal liability for railroads under the Interstate
Commerce Act.2 3
The facts that came before the Supreme Court vividly illustrated
the problems described in the ICC's 1891 report. The prosecution
involved the payment of illegal rebates in violation of the requirement
that railroads charge all shippers at the same published rate. 24 New
York Central's manager and assistant traffic manager agreed to an
illegal rebate of five cents off the published price (twenty-three cents
per one hundred pounds) in a contract to ship large amounts of sugar
from New York to Detroit. 25 The Supreme Court noted that without the
rebate the sugar might have been sent by boat, and the lower price
helped the railroad respond to "severe competition with other shippers
and dealers." 26 The managers were acting for the benefit of the
railroad, not their own personal benefit, in granting the rebates. 27 It
seems unlikely that the fine imposed upon the manager-$1,000 per
violation-would have been an effective deterrent to similar actions by
New York Central or its competitors. 28 Moreover, if only the employees
had been prosecuted, the jurors might have balked at convicting them
of a regulatory offense that benefitted only their corporate employer.
And, as the ICC feared, failure to hold the railroad responsible in this

22. Id. at 16-17.
23. The Elkins Act provided:
That anything done or omitted to be done by a corporation common carrier, subject to
the Act to regulate commerce and the Acts amendatory thereof, which, if done or
omitted to be done by any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee,
agent, or person acting for or employed by such corporation, would constitute a
misdemeanor under said Acts or under this Act shall also be held to be a
misdemeanor committed by such corporation, and upon conviction thereof it shall be
subject to like penalties as are prescribed in said Acts or by this Act, with reference to
such persons, except as such penalties are herein changed.

In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section the act, omission, or failure
of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common carrier
acting within the scope of his employment shall in every case be also deemed to be
the act, omission, or failure of such carrier as well as that of the person.
Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903).
24. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1909).
25. Id. at 490.
26. Id.at490-91.
27. Id.
28. Id.at490.
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case would have threatened the legitimacy and public respect for the
law. 2 9 In contrast, under the Elkins Act it was possible to prosecute
both the railroad and the employees; 30 the railroad's penalty was
$18,000 per violation, which added up to a total of $108,000.31
Adjusted for inflation, this penalty is equivalent to more than $2.7
million in 2016,32 a sum that would have been much more likely to get
the attention of New York Central and its competitors.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected New York Central's
claim that the imposition of criminal liability was unconstitutional, and
the Court established the federal standard for corporate criminal
33
liability, extending the tort concept of respondeatsuperior.
As in tort
law, the corporation may be held responsible for acts of the agent 34 in
the course of his or her employment when the act is done, in whole or
in part, for the benefit of the principal-here, the corporation.3 5 Rather
than construing an agent's powers strictly, the Court reasoned that a
corporation may be held responsible for acts an agent has "assumed to
perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers
actually authorized."3 6 "[M]aking and fixing rates was within the scope
of the authority" of the general freight manager and the assistant
freight managers, and New York Central was properly held liable for
their acts.37 The Court explained it was going "only a step farther" than
the tort cases in holding that "the act of the agent, while exercising the
authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be
controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his
employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is
acting in the premises."3 8

29.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, S. Misc. Doc. No. 52-31, at 16 (1st

Session) (1892).
30. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (Acts, omissions, and failures of officers and
employees "shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission, or failure of such carrier as
well as that of the person." (emphasis added)).
31. N.Y Cent., 212 U.S. at 490.
32. Inflation Calculator, IN2013DOLLARS.COM, http://www.in2013dollars.com/1909-dollarsin-2016?amount=108000 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (calculating $108,000 in 1909 to be
equivalent to $2,730,381.79 in 2016).
33. See N.Y Cent., 212 U.S. at 494-99 (reasoning that public policy required corporations be
held punishable with fines based on the knowledge and intent of the corporation's agents, who
have been granted authority to act on the corporation's behalf).
34. Id. at 493 (citing Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109,111 (1893)).
35. Id. (citing Lothropv. Adams, 133 Mass. 471, 471 (1882)).
36. Id. at 493-94 (citing Wash. Gas-Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 544 (1899)).
37. Id. at 494.
38. Id.
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Acknowledging an early statement by Blackstone that a
corporation cannot commit a crime,39 the Court commented that
"modern authority" accepted corporate criminal liability. The Court
quoted, with approval, the following passage from an American
criminal law treatise:
Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents, their purposes,
motives, and intent are just as much those of the corporation as are
the things done. If, for example, the invisible, intangible essence or
air which we term a corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys,
lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to
do it, and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously. 40
The Court determined that the imposition of corporate criminal
liability was critical to the success of the regulation of interstate
shipping rates, and it rejected the idea that there was any impediment
to this important legislation. 41 The opinion noted that the Elkins Act
was adopted after the ICC published multiple reports stating that
"statutes against rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as
individuals only were subject to punishment for violation of the law,
when the giving of rebates or concessions inured to the benefit of the
corporations of which the individuals were but the instruments."4 2 In
reaching this result, the Court focused on the public policy benefit
inherent in securing equal rights to interstate transportation with one
generally accessible legal rate. 43 The Court also made it clear that it was
not illegal-rather it was good public policy-to hold a corporation
responsible for the actions of agents the corporation authorized to set
rates, especially when those actions resulted in a profit for the
corporation.44 Since the great majority of business transactions and
almost all interstate commerce were in the hands of corporations,
giving the corporations immunity from criminal punishment, based on
what the Court characterized as "the old and exploded doctrine that a
corporation cannot commit a crime," would effectively "take away the
only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting

39.

Id. at 492 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476).

40.

Id. at 492-93 (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTS ON THE CRIM. LAW UPON A NEW

SYS. OF LEGAL EXPOS. § 417, 255-56 (1892)). Bishop has been called 'the foremost law writer of the
age.' Stephen A. Siegel, Bishop, Joel Prentiss, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICT. OF AM. L. 47 (Roger K.
Newman ed., 2009).
41. N.YCent.,212U.S.at496.

42. Id.at495.
43. Id. at 495-96.
44. Id. at 495.
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the abuses aimed at." 4 5 Since Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce to prevent favoritism was well established, it would be a
distinct step backwards to accept the railroad's arguments.
The Supreme Court's extended discussion of public policy and its
critical reference to "the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation
cannot commit a crime" are consistent with a view of law that rejects
legal formalism and allows criminal as well as civil law to develop to
meet the needs of the time.4 6 Although he did not write the opinion in
New York Central, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a member of the
Court when it heard and decided the case.47 Holmes is, of course,
famous for the following statement:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. 48
New York Central was also consistent with other Supreme Court
decisions giving full effect to different critical aspects of the federal
antitrust legislation adopted during this period. 49 Historians have
noted that both public opinion and federal policy seem to have reached
a turning point in the years immediately preceding the New York
Central decision.5 0 President Theodore Roosevelt took great interest in
the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and Congress appropriated
special funds for enforcement and provided for expedited appeal of
antitrust cases to the Supreme Court.51 Although the Supreme Court's
45. Id. at 495-96.
46. Id. at 496.
47. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in 1882. Maria C. Royle, Climbing the Beanstalk:Justice Holmes and the Searchfor Reconciliation, 22
VT. L. REV. 559, 583 (1998). He served there until his appointment to the United States Supreme
Court in 1902. Id.
48.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

49. See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 573 (1898) (rejecting the
argument that Congress' antitrust legislation unconstitutionally intruded on individuals' right to
contract); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 326-27 (1897) (broadly
construing the Sherman Act to govern railroads).
50.

HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION

560-61 (1954).

51. Id.
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first decision gave the Sherman Antitrust Act a narrow reading that
threatened its effectiveness, the Court subsequently issued a series of
decisions between 1897 and 1911 that upheld lower court decisions
preventing mergers, and it broke up the Standard Oil and American
Tobacco trustS. 5 2 The opinion in New York Central endorsed another
critical aspect of the new legislative framework:
Given the prominence of corporations in interstate commerce, their
immense potential to do wrong, and the absence of other regulatory
mechanisms, a powerful deterrent would have been lost by
restricting criminal liability to agents. Individuals
and
organizations, it seemed, had few incentives without the prospect of
vicarious liability. With joint and several liability, however, both the
principal and its agents have a distinct risk of liability and, from this,
a reciprocal incentive for law abidance.
The simple-minded public policy that emerged in [New York
Central] seemed ideal in its shared allocation of risks to both
principal and agent. Corporate liability deters crime; it moves the
risk of loss away from risk averse officers and directors toward the
firm; it efficiently distributes liability risk between the firm and
employees. Without significant entity liability or even shared
liability, some argued, incentives would be seen as too weak to
ensure an organizational commitment to law abidance.5
Although the only question presented in New York Central was
whether the imposition of corporate criminal liability under the Elkins
Act would violate due process, 54 the Supreme Court's opinion was
written far more broadly. The holding in New York Central has been
understood to be a strong endorsement of corporate criminal liability
and the respondeatsuperior test, which is now applied to other federal
offenses in all federal courts.5 5 Despite scholarly criticism, the federal
courts have declined to narrow the standard of liability by requiring
the government to prove that the corporation lacked effective policies
and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its employees.5 6

52. See id. at 445-77, 561-63 (discussing the series of antitrust cases decided between 1897
and 1911).
53. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
54. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909).
55. Laufer, supra note 53, at 1363-64.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining
that both the district and appellate courts rejected this argument made by a high level group of
amici seeking to use the prosecution as a test case for reform).
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III. THE EVOLVING ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Over the past three decades, the DOJ and the Sentencing
Commission have reshaped the implementation of corporate criminal
liability in the federal system. The new policies respond to various
critiques of corporate criminal liability founded on respondeatsuperior.
Standards guiding the decision whether to prosecute and guidelines
determining what sanctions to impose on corporations that have been
convicted now focus on corporate culpability. These standards and
guidelines also seek to prevent future wrongdoing, advance other
social goals (such as restitution to victims), and minimize undesirable
social costs. These practices have substantially narrowed the real scope
of corporate criminal responsibility and reduced the pressure for
doctrinal change.
A. The Administrative Standards Governing Prosecutorial Discretion
The United States Attorneys'Manual (USAM) provides both general
standards for the exercise of federal prosecutors' charging discretion
applicable to all cases, and specific provisions governing the
prosecution of corporations and other business entities. 5 7 The
Principlesof FederalProsecution of Business Organizations(Principlesof
Prosecution)5 8 makes it clear that federal prosecutors should not bring
criminal charges merely because a case can be made on the basis of

57.

Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL at 9-27.220 to 9-27.230

(stating general standards), availableat http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/
usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220 [hereinafter "USAM"], with the standards for corporate
prosecutions that are described below. The general standard states that federal prosecutors
should recommend prosecution when they believe conduct constitutes a federal crime and the
admissible evidence will be sufficient for conviction, unless no federal interest would be served by
prosecution, the person is subject to effective prosecution in another district, or there are
adequate non-criminal alternatives to prosecution. Id. Subsequent portions of the USAM state that
in all cases federal prosecutors should consider:
1. Federal law enforcement priorities;
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense;
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution;
4. The
5. The
6. The
and
7. The

person's culpability in connection with the offense;
person's history with respect to criminal activity;
person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others;
probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.

Id. at 9-27.230.
58. Id.at9-28.000.
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59 Rather, prosecutors must consider a variety of
respondeat superior.
factors that identify corporate blameworthiness and assess the
adequacy of alternatives to federal prosecution, including those
deemed most important by the critics of respondeat superior.60 The
Principlesof Prosecutionseems to mimic or adopt the moral culpability
analysis recommended by many scholars. 61 The Principles of
Prosecutionstates:

In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring
charges, and negotiating plea or other agreements, prosecutors
should consider the following factors in reaching a decision as to
the proper treatment of a corporate target:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any,
governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories
of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by
corporate management;
3. the corporation's history of similar misconduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation's willingness to cooperate in the investigation of
its agents;
5. the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing
compliance program;

59. Id.at9-28.300(A),9-28.1300(A).
60. Id.
61. E.g., Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The DOJ's Internal MoralCulpability Standardfor Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7, 12-14 (2011). Although
corporate criminal liability has been criticized on many grounds, "the sharpest and the most
consistent criticism" is the claim "that it is both unwise and fundamentally unfair" to use
respondeat superior-which requires no proof of corporate fault-as the basis for criminal
liability. Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1513
(2009). For summaries of this critique and others, see Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481 (2009) (describing critiques based on the
overbreadth of federal criminal law, the imposition of criminal liability without fault, excessive
penalties, excessive prosecutorial power); Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments
in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 89 (2004) (describing retributive and utilitarian critiques; the latter include law and
economic and pubic choice perspectives).
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voluntary

disclosure

7. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts
implement an effective corporate compliance program or
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management,
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and
cooperate with the relevant government agencies;

of

to
to
to
to

8. collateral
consequences,
including
whether
there
is
disproportionate
harm to shareholders,
pension holders,
employees, and others not proven personally culpable, as well as
impact on the public arising from the prosecution;
9. the adequacy of remedies
enforcement actions; and

such

as

civil

or

regulatory

10. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for
the corporation's malfeasance. 62

Several of these factors address key aspects of corporate
culpability that are not relevant to the bare test of respondeatsuperior,
including the seriousness of the harm done, the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation
(including the role of
management), the history of similar misconduct, and the existence and
effectiveness of any preexisting compliance program.
Indeed, the USAM expressly states that whether a corporation
should be held criminally responsible does not turn solely on the
application of respondeat superior and "it may not be appropriate to
impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust
compliance program in place, under a strict respondeatsuperior theory
for the single isolated act of a rogue employee." 63 The accompanying
commentary also addresses the role and conduct of managementcharacterizing it as "the most important" of the factors because "a
corporation is directed by its management and management is
responsible for a corporate culture in which criminal conduct is either
discouraged or tacitly encouraged." 64 These factors bring federal

62. USAM at 9-28.300(A) (internal cross-references omitted).
63. Id. at 9-28.500(A) (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 9-28.500(B) (comment).
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practice close to the standards proposed by many critics of respondeat
superior.65
The Principles of Prosecution also requires prosecutors to give
weight to another factor deemed critical by commentators: 66 the
existence of a corporate compliance program. 67 The commentary
recognizes that good faith efforts to comply with the law may show a
lack of organizational culpability or, alternatively, the compliance
program may be no more than ineffective window dressing.68
Accordingly, prosecutors are instructed to consider "whether the
program is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in
preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees and whether
corporate management is enforcing the program or is tacitly
encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to
achieve business objectives." 69 In evaluating the adequacy of the
program, prosecutors should consider the program's design,
implementation, review, and revisions; whether there was a sufficient
staff to audit and analyze the compliance efforts; and whether
employees were adequately informed.
The Principles of Prosecution also addresses the criticism that civil
or administrative enforcement may be preferable to criminal
prosecution, and that criminal sanctions may impose unwarranted
penalties on innocent parties, including shareholders, as well as
members of the general public. Prosecutors are instructed to consider
the adequacy of prosecuting only the responsible individuals and
whether noncriminal alternatives, such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions, "would adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate
a corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct."7 0 This evaluation
requires a case-by-case consideration of the need for criminal
sanctions, including in part, an evaluation of the other sanctions that
are available, the likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed,
and the strength of the regulatory authority's interest.7 1

65. See, e.g., Dervan, supra note 61 (describing the moral culpability analysis that critics
suggest is necessary when determining corporate criminal liability).

66. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1529 n.39
(2009) (collecting authorities advocating a good faith defense encompassing compliance).
67. USAM at 9-28.800(B) (comment) (noting, however, that a compliance program "that
specifically prohibited the very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from
criminal liability").

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.at9-28.1200(A).
Id.at9-28.1200.
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Prosecutors are also instructed to consider "collateral
consequences" of a corporate criminal conviction, taking into account
the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation's employees,
investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may,
depending on the size and nature of the corporation and their role
in its operations, have played no role in the criminal conduct, have
been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it.72
Because such factors will exist to some degree in every corporate
prosecution, prosecutors are encouraged to weigh the collateral
consequences in light of other relevant factors, such as the seriousness
of the harm and pervasiveness of misconduct.7 3
Finally, prosecutors are instructed to consider several factors
concerning post-offense conduct, including whether the corporation
cooperated in the investigation and has made restitution, or has taken
other remedial actions. 74 The Principles of Prosecution treats these
remedial actions as factors that help to measure corporate character or
culpability, stating in the commentary that:
A corporation's response to misconduct says much about its
willingness to ensure that such misconduct does not recur. Thus,
corporations that fully recognize the seriousness of their
misconduct and accept responsibility for it should be taking steps to
implement the personnel, operational, and organizational changes
necessary to establish awareness among employees that criminal
conduct will not be tolerated. 75
As a result, prosecutors consider the integrity and credibility of
the corporation's remedial and disciplinary procedures, and whether
the corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers once they were
identified. 76 Quick recognition of flaws in a compliance program and
changes to that program are also relevant. A closely related mitigating
factor affecting the decision to prosecute is a "corporation's timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing" and its cooperation with the

72. Id. at 9-28.1100.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 9-28.700 to 9-28.760 (discussing the value of cooperation, attorney-client/work
product protections, and obstruction); id. at 9-28.1000 (examining the weight afforded to
restitution).
75. Id. at 9-28.1000(B). But see Dervan, supra note 61, at 15-17 (arguing that post offense
conduct is not relevant to culpability in the commission of the offense).

76. USAMat9-28.1000(B).
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government's investigation.77 It is often difficult for outside
investigators to determine which individuals took action on behalf of
the corporation and to find the relevant evidence, so the USAM gives
weight to "the corporation's willingness to provide relevant
information and evidence and identify relevant actors within and
outside the corporation, including senior executives."78 This
cooperation may be especially beneficial to both the Government and
the corporation, because without the corporation's assistance there
might be a protracted investigation that would disrupt the
corporation's business operations.
Finally, the Principlesof Prosecutionrecognizes that in some cases
there is another option in corporate cases-a deferred prosecution or
non-prosecution agreement-that avoids the necessity for a prosecutor
to charge or not charge:
[W]here the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction for
innocent third parties would be significant, it may be appropriate to
consider a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement
with conditions designed, among other things, to promote
compliance with applicable law and to prevent recidivism. Such
agreements are a third option, besides a criminal indictment, on the
one hand, and a declination, on the other. Declining prosecution
may allow a corporate criminal to escape without consequences.
Obtaining a conviction may produce a result that seriously harms
innocent third parties who played no role in the criminal conduct.
Under appropriate circumstances, a deferred prosecution or nonprosecution agreement can help restore the integrity of a
company's operations and preserve the financial viability of a
corporation that has engaged in criminal conduct, while preserving
the government's ability to prosecute a recalcitrant corporation that
materially breaches the agreement. Such agreements achieve other
important objectives as well, like prompt restitution for victims. The
appropriateness of a criminal charge against a corporation, or some
lesser alternative, must be evaluated in a pragmatic and reasoned
way that produces a fair outcome, taking into consideration, among
other things, the Department's need to promote and ensure respect
79
for the law.

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)
agreements (NPAs) are discussed below.

77.
78.
79.

Id. at 9-28.300(A), 9-28.900.
Id.at9-28.700.
Id. at 9-28.1100(B) (comment) (footnote omitted).

and

non-prosecution
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B. The Impact of the Administrative Standards Governing Federal
Prosecutions
Although respondeat superior seems to permit a corporate
prosecution whenever a rogue employee has violated the law, the
discretionary approach under the Principles of Prosecution has
substantially narrowed the effective reach of corporate liability. For
example, between 2007 and 2015, fewer than two hundred
corporations have been convicted per year in the federal courts.8 0
Though the number of corporate prosecutions is quite small, the
potential for corporate criminal liability nonetheless has a dramatic
effect on corporate conduct, providing a powerful incentive for
corporate cooperation. Rather than oppose Government investigations,
corporations help build the case against individual wrongdoers and
settle claims against the corporation itself. Because the Principles of
Prosecution treats corporate cooperation as a substantial factor
weighing against prosecution,81 U.S. corporations that receive reports
of suspicious activity generally bring in counsel to conduct a rigorous
internal investigation, and require their officers and employees to
cooperate with the internal investigation. 8 2 If an internal investigation
uncovers wrongdoing, it is generally to the corporation's advantage to
inform the Government of the relevant information and negotiate a
settlement that avoids or minimizes the entity's criminal liability.8 3
Settlements take several forms. In many cases, corporations avoid
criminal liability but accept civil liability and pay significant fines. 84 In
other cases, negotiated guilty pleas also settle civil and administrative
80. This figure is based on the Sentencing Commission's yearly reports of corporate
convictions. See, e.g., 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics-Table51, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, availableat http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/Table5l.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (detailing by
category of crime the organizations that were convicted and showing what type(s) of punishment
each bore).

81. USAM

at 9-28.900

(covering voluntary disclosures);

id. at9-28.700 to 9-28.750

(discussing cooperation).
82. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, Does DOJ's Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales
Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilegeand the Work ProductDoctrine?A Preliminary"No," 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1237, 1259 (2008) (noting that internal investigations have "'become the standard of
care whenever credible allegations of significant misconduct are raised in organizational settings'
and "[i]ncreasingly . . large-scale or particularly sensitive investigations are conducted by outside
counsel from a law firm expert in such inquiries").

83. USAMat9-28.900.
84. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Bank of America to Pay $131.8 Million Penalty in Mortgage

Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/bank-ofamerica-to-pay-13 1-8-million-penalty-in-c-d-o-deals/?src=recg&_r=0
(discussing the Bank of
America case resulting from its role in the recent Recession and touching upon other financial
institution cases of a similar nature).

2016]

CorporateCriminalLiability and the Yates Memo

57

charges. In 2009, for example, Pfizer Inc. and a subsidiary agreed to pay
$2.3 billion, which was "the largest health care fraud settlement in the
history of the Department of Justice, to resolve criminal and civil
liability arising from the illegal promotion of certain pharmaceutical
products."8 5 The settlement included a criminal fine of $1.195 billion
and forfeiture of $105 million, along with a payment of $1 billion to
resolve the allegations under the civil False Claims Act and $102
million to provide to civil claimants. 86 Some federal settlements also
resolve state charges.8 7
Alternatively, the DOJ and a corporation may settle criminal, civil,
and administrative charges by entering into a DPA or NPA. Unlike an
NPA, a DPA requires judicial approval; information charging the
offense and the DPA are filed with, and must be approved by, a federal
district court.88 Since 2000, the DOJ has entered into 404 publicly
disclosed DPAs and NPAs, and it is thought that there have been others
that were not publicized.89
These agreements frequently include provisions that the court
could not require without the defendant's agreement. For example,
British Petroleum's guilty plea agreement, arising from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, included a fine of $4 billion,9 0
which consisted of $2.4 billion dedicated to acquiring, restoring,
preserving, and conserving the marine and coastal environments,
ecosystems, and bird and wildlife habitats; $350 million to fund
research, development, education, and training to be conducted by the

85. justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-civ-900
.html.
86. Id.
87. See generally Sara Sun Beale, What Are the Rules If Everybody Wants to Play?: Multiple
Federal and State Prosecutors Acting as Regulators, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW To REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 202, 202 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow

eds., 2011) (discussing how multijurisdictional cases with cooperation between the federal
government and state governments, where the federal government takes the lead, can lead to
state charges being dropped as part of the federal settlement agreement).
88. Id.
89. See 2015 Year-End Update on CorporateNon-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs),
GIBSON,
DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
(Jan.
5, 2016),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-NonProsecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx#_ftnref2
(showing figures
based on the yearly totals in chart 1, excluding eight DPAs entered into by the SEC). For the years
2001-2012, Brandon Garrett has identified 255 DPAs and NPAs. Brandon L. Garrett, The
CorporateCriminalAs Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1790, 1800 (2015).
90. Guilty Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., Docket No. 2:12cr-00292-SSV-DEK, (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013), availableat http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/43320121115143613990027.pdf.
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National Academy of Sciences; and the appointment of process safety
and ethics monitors.9 1
Employing DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ has brought "structural reform
prosecutions" aimed at the adoption of sweeping internal corporate
reforms. 9 2 Using these techniques, the DOJ obtained demanding
settlements from corporations such as "AIG, America Online, Boeing,
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG,
MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co., and Monsanto," and also various public
entities.9 3
C. Corporate Sentencing
The advisory Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)
provide
comprehensive recommendations for organizational sentencing in the
federal courts, 9 4 including not only fines but also remedial measures
and probation. The Guidelines tailor the fines to corporate culpability
(not bare criminality), and they provide for other non-punitive
remedial measures as well as measures intended to reform the
corporation and decrease the likelihood of future offenses.95 The
Guidelines were "designed so that the sanctions imposed upon
organizations and their agents, taken together, will provide just
punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to
maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting
criminal conduct."9 6
1. Fine Determination
Under the Guidelines, fine amounts are largely a function of
organizational culpability. Except in the rare case of a wholly criminal
organization (which is to be divested of all its assets),9 7 the Guidelines

91. Id. at 4, Exhibit B, Exhibit B-1.
92. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854
(2007) (empirically analyzing the use of structural reform prosecutions).
93. Id. at 855.
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B introductory cmt. (2012). In United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60, 266 (2005), the Supreme Court held that mandatory guidelines
based on facts found by a judge (and not a jury) would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury. In order to preserve the Guidelines system, the Court concluded that the
Guidelines must be treated as advisory only. Id. In Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344,
2348-49 (2012), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee applies to the
imposition of criminal fines as well as terms of imprisonment.
95.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

96. Id.
97. Id.

§

8 introductory cmt.
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provide that "the fine range... should be based on the seriousness of
the offense and the culpability of the organization."9 8 To determine
culpability, the Guidelines assign a numerical score, based on specified
aggravating and mitigating factors, which allows courts to calculate a
recommended fine range. The Guidelines instruct the courts to
consider a range of factors:
The seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the
greatest of the pecuniary gain, the pecuniary loss, or the amount in
a guideline offense level fine table. Culpability generally will be
determined by six factors that the sentencing court must consider.
The four factors that increase the ultimate punishment of an
organization are: (i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal
activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation
of an order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice. The two factors that
mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the
existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii)
self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility. 99
When selecting a fine within the recommended range, courts are
encouraged to weigh policy factors including "the seriousness of the
offense," the nature of the organization's involvement, the "collateral
consequences of conviction," the involvement of a vulnerable victim,
whether the offense resulted in nonpecuniary damages, and whether
the corporation or its high-level personnel have a history of civil or
criminal misconduct. 100 The Guidelines also provide for a lesser fine if
"necessary to avoid substantially jeopardizing the continued viability of
the organization."1 01
Upward or downward departures and variances from the
Guidelines range are permitted in individual cases on the basis of
factors that may also reflect lesser or greater culpability or harm. 102
The Guidelines identify factors "not... adequately taken into
consideration by the guidelines" that might warrant upward or
downward departure from the recommended range on an individual
basis. 103 An upward departure may be warranted if the organization is
exceptionally culpable or if the offense involved official corruption; it
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.§§8C2.8(a)(1)-(7).
Id.§8C3.3(b).

102. See generally id. §§ 8C4.1-4.11 (listing a series of factors that may grant a departure from
fines established within the guidelines).
103. Id. § 8C4 introductory cmt.
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caused a risk of death or bodily injury; or it caused a threat to national
security, the environment, or a market. 104 A downward departure may
be warranted if the organization provides substantial assistance to
authorities in the prosecution of other offenders; the organization is a
public entity; the victims of the crime were members or beneficiaries of
the organization; or the organization has agreed to pay remedial costs
that greatly exceed the organization's criminal gain. 105
2. Compliance Programs
Although efforts to prevent the offense are not a defense to
liability based on respondeat superior, under the Guidelines an
"Effective Compliance and Ethics Program" in place at the time of the
offense generally reduces a corporation's culpability score. 106 This
reduction does not apply, however, if the organization "unreasonably
delayed reporting the offense,"10 7 or if high-level corporate officials
"participated in, condoned, or [were] willfully ignorant of the
offense."10 8 Additionally, in selecting a fine within the culpability range,
courts are encouraged to select a higher fine if the organization failed
to have such a program at the time of the offense. 109
3. Probation
Probation provides a mechanism for supervision following
conviction to encourage rehabilitation and minimize the chances of
reoffending.110 In felony cases, the Guidelines provide for one to five
years of corporate probation.11 1 In all other cases, probation of up to
five years is appropriate, 112 where necessary, "to ensure that another
sanction will be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken
within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal

104. Id. § 8C4.11 (exceptional culpability); § 8C4.6 (official corruption); § 8C4.2 (risk of death
or bodily injury); § 8C4.3 (threat to national security); § 8C4.4 (threat to the environment);
§ 8C4.5 (threat to a market).
105. Id. § 8C4.1 (substantial assistance); § 8C4.7 (public entity); § 8C4.8 (victims were
members of the organization); § 8C4.9 (agreement to pay remedial costs that exceed
organization's gain).
106. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1).
107. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(2).
108. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(A).
109. Id. § 8C2.8(a)(11) (stating the factors the court should consider).
110. Id. § 8 introductory cmt.
111. Id. § 8D1.2(a)(1).
112. Id. § 8D1.2(a)(2).
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conduct."113 In determining the conditions of probation, the Guidelines
advise courts to "consider the views" of governmental regulatory
bodies responsible for supervising the organization's conduct. 114 In the
fiscal year 2015, 76.8% of convicted organizational offenders were
placed on probation. 115
4. Remedial Measures
The Guidelines provide that, whenever possible, corporate
sentencing should include non-punitive remedial measures aimed at
making the victims whole. 1 16 Courts may order organizations to give
notice to victims 117 and to make monetary or in-kind restitution. 118
Organizations may be subject to remedial orders such as product
recalls and environmental clean-up orders.11 9 They may be ordered to
perform community service if they are "uniquely" competent to repair
the harm caused. 120 Community service requirements must be
"reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense." 121
Additionally, courts may require, as a condition to probation, an
"effective compliance and ethics program" designed to "prevent and
detect criminal conduct" and promote an ethical corporate culture. 122
In fiscal year 2015, compliance programs were ordered in 28.2% of all
corporate crime cases. 123

113. Id. § 8 introductory cmt.
114. Id. § 8D1.4 cmt. n..
115. 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics-Table 53, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2015/Table53.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 introductory cmt.
117. Id.§8B1.4.
118. Id. § 811.1. Data from Fiscal Year 2015 shows that restitution orders are less frequent
than one might expect. In 2015, only 16.6 % of corporations were sentenced to both fines and
restitution, 14.4 % received restitution only and in 48.1% of cases the court only imposed a fine.
2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics-Table 51, supra note 80 (explaining the
punishments imposed on convicted corporations). The median restitution amount imposed in
fiscal year 2015 was $407,541, while the mean amount was $19,471,980. 2015 Sourcebook of
Federal Sentencing Statistics-Table 52,
U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION,
available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2015/Table52.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 811.2 cmt. (explaining that the guidelines specify
that remedial orders are potentially duplicative of administrative penalties and "should be
coordinated with any administrative or civil actions").
120. Id. § 811.3 cmt. Direct monetary sanctions are preferable to community service where the
corporation is not "uniquely" qualified to remedy the harm. Id.
121. Id.§8B1.3.
122. Id. §§ 8B2.1(a)(1), 8D1.4(b)(1).
123. 2015 Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics-Table 53, supra note 115.
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CRITICISM OF THE DOJ'S PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES AND THE
YATES MEMO

IV

Despite the efforts of the DOJ and the Sentencing Commission to
align corporate criminal liability with culpability and to employ
criminal liability to promote a variety of social goals, the Government's
practices have been widely criticized, especially in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis. The intense criticism of the DOJ's conduct during
the tenure of Attorney General Eric Holder set the stage for the Yates
Memo.
A.

Criticism of the DOJ's Prosecutorial Practices in Corporate
Cases

Scholars, judges, and members of Congress have questioned the
propriety and effectiveness of the Government's use of charging and
sentencing discretion to create incentives for corporate cooperation in
identifying culpable individual conduct. 124 Although they agree that the
DOJ's practices are flawed, critics do not all identify the same problems.
Some critics charge that broad entity liability under respondeat
superior imposes undue pressure on corporations and undermines
fundamental rights, including the right to counsel. 125 They say
corporations have been forced to become part of the prosecutorial
team. 126 This line of argument suggests that the DOJ has been too
aggressive in compelling corporations to assist in the pursuit of
individuals.
But other critics charge that the Government too seldom employs
the fruits of corporate cooperation to bring individual prosecutions,
even when a corporation's own admissions have made it clear that
there were culpable individuals. 127 The DOJ has been widely criticized
124. See generally, e.g., Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the
Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 32-58, 59-96 (2010) (tracing the
development of the role of the corporation as a branch office of the prosecutor and describing the
negative effects of this change).
125. See, e.g., id. at 53-57 (explaining that the DOJ routinely demanded the entity under
investigation waive attorney-client privilege and not advance their employees' legal fee, resulting
in inadequate legal representation).
126. Id.at28.
127. The most prominent scholarly critic is Brandon Garrett. See generally Brandon L. Garrett,
The CorporateCriminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1794-96, 1830 (2015) (arguing
that individuals are seldom prosecuted when corporate crimes are investigated and proposing
several reforms). The most prominent Congressional critic is Senator Elizabeth Warren. See, e.g.,
Peter Schroeder, Sens. Warren, Shelby: CriminalBank Execs Should Face Arrest, HILL (Sept. 9, 2014,
12:49 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/217110-warren-shelby-agree-on-need-toprosecute-bank-execs (describing Senator Warren as "a longtime advocate for harsher penalties
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for failing to be sufficiently aggressive in prosecuting employees for
misconduct in connection with the financial crisis of 2008.128 According
to this view, the practice of seeking corporate cooperation and
structural reforms has displaced efforts to prosecute individuals and
has undermined, rather than enhanced, deterrence. Judge Jed Rakoff
stated the argument this way:
Although it is supposedly justified because it prevents future
crimes, I suggest that the future deterrent value of successfully
prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of
imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more
than window-dressing. Just going after the company is also both
technically and morally suspect. It is technically suspect because,
under the law, you should not indict or threaten to indict a company
unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some
managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime; and
if you can prove that, why not indict the manager? And from a moral
standpoint, punishing a company and its many innocent employees
and shareholders for the crimes committed by some unprosecuted
individuals seems contrary to elementary notions of moral
responsibility. 129
B.

The Yates Memo

The widespread criticism of the Holder Administration's response
to the 2008 financial crisis set the stage for the reassessment of
prosecutorial policies and practices that took place after the
confirmation of Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Deputy Attorney
General Sally Yates. 130

for individual executives" and noting her "concern that actions tied to the financial collapse have
resulted in fines and settlements but not arrests").
128. See generally Robert Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal PunishmentAfter
the Financial Crisis, 22 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 103, 128-37 (2015) (noting the popular criticism of
Judge Rakoff and numerous polls finding that many Americans felt that banks and their employees
were not prosecuted accordingly, leading to "a sense of unpunished criminality").
129. Jed S. Rakoff, The FinancialCrisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 61

N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), available athttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/
financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. On the other hand, there has also been criticism
of the DOJ's failure to prosecute any banks for their role in the financial crisis. E.g., David M.
Uhlmann, Op-Ed., ProsecutionDeferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), at A23, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/opinion/prosecution-deferred-justice-denied.html.
130. Deputy Attorney General Yates has said that when she and Attorney General Lynch
arrived at the DOJ to take up their new responsibilities, both had the public's concerns about
Departmental policies in corporate fraud cases foremost in their minds. Deputy Attorney General
Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy
on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-
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The Yates Memo restates the DOJ's view of criminal law and
prosecutorial discretion as utilitarian tools that should be used
pragmatically to protect the public, but it also emphasizes a new
element: the public demand for individual accountability. The bulk of
the Yates Memo makes pragmatic adjustments in departmental
practices to overcome the special problems of pursuing individuals for
misconduct in the corporate setting. 13 1 These procedural adjustments
are intended to implement the policy decision to "strengthen [the]
pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing." 13 2 This policy decision,
rather than the procedures that implement it, is the heart of the Yates
Memo.
In the formal memorandum announcing the policy, Deputy
Attorney General Yates began by identifying the overarching goal of
corporate enforcement in purely utilitarian terms: "protect[ing] our
financial system and, by extension, all our citizens." 133 But in explaining
the reemphasis on individual liability, Yates did not rest solely on
utilitarian reasoning:
One of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is
by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the
wrongdoing. Such accountability is important for several reasons: it
deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in corporate
behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for

remarks-new-york-university-school [hereinafter Yates Remarks Sept. 10, 2015]. Accordingly, they
convened "a group of experienced lawyers from all across the department and the U.S. Attorney
community" to examine how the DOJ approaches corporate investigations. Id.
131. Ms. Yates described the challenges:
[T]hese cases do have a special set of challenges, challenges that can impede our
ability to identify the responsible parties and to bring them to justice. It is not easy to
disentangle who did what within a huge corporate structure-to discern whether
anyone had the requisite knowledge and intent. Blurred lines of authority make it
hard to identify who is responsible for individual business decisions and it can be
difficult to determine whether high-ranking executives, who appear to be removed
from day-to-day operations, were part of a particular scheme. There are often
massive numbers of electronic documents and for corporations that operate
worldwide, there are restrictive foreign data privacy laws and a limited ability to
compel the testimony of witnesses abroad.
Justice News, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates Delivers Remarks at the New York City Bar
Association White Collar Crime Conference, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 10, 2016), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-citybar-association [hereinafter Yates Remarks May 10, 2016].
132. Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 2-3.
133. Id.at1.
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their actions, and it promotes the public's confidence in our justice
system. 134
Deterrence and preventing future misconduct by changing corporate
behavior are utilitarian goals. But Yates' separate emphasis on holding
the proper parties "responsible" seems to strike a retributive note, and
it is difficult to connect her final comment about public confidence in
the justice system with any of the standard theories of punishment.
On at least two occasions, Yates has restated the DOJ's concern
with public opinion. Speaking the day after the release of her memo,
Yates seemed to acknowledge that public criticism of the DOJ's failure
to bring individual prosecutions was one of the factors motivating the
new policy:
[R]egardless of how challenging it may be to make a case against
individuals in a corporate fraud case, it's our responsibility at the
Department of Justice to overcome these challenges and do
everything we can to develop the evidence and bring these cases.
The public expects and demands this accountability. Americans
should never believe, even incorrectly, that one's criminal activity
will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a
corporation. We could be doing a bang-up job in every facet of the
department's operations-we could be bringing all the right cases
and making all the right decisions. But if the citizens of this country
don't have confidence that the criminal justice system operates
fairly and applies equally-regardless of who commits the crime or
where it is committed-then we're in trouble.135
Eight months later, Yates restated the rationale for the policy
announced in the Yates Memo, again emphasizing both utilitarian
grounds-deterrence and changing corporate culture-and the need
for prosecutorial policies that are perceived to be fair. 136

134. Id.
135. Yates Remarks Sept. 10, 2015, supra note 130.
136. Speaking at the White Collar Crime Conference in 2016, Yates stated:
The bad acts of individuals have grave consequences, from the loss of jobs to the
corruption of government officials, from the foreclosure of homes to the destruction
of financial security and economic confidence. So holding accountable the people who
committed the wrongdoing is essential if we are truly going to deter corporate
misdeeds, have a real impact on corporate culture and ensure that the public has
confidence in our justice system. We cannot have a different system of justice-or the
perception of a different system of justice-for corporate executives than we do for
everyone else.
Yates Remarks May 10, 2016, supra note 131.
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What should we make of this emphasis on public opinion and the
public demand for individual accountability? In context, it seems to be
a clear reference to criticism of the failure to prosecute individuals
responsible for the corporate wrongdoing in the financial crisis of
2008. Many knowledgeable observers faulted the DOJ for emphasizing
corporate settlements and failing to pursue individual liability,13 7 and
the Yates Memo may be a desirable course correction in response to
well-founded critiques by experts as well as the general public. Yates'
utilitarian arguments linking individual liability to deterrence and
changes in corporate culture are consistent with many of the expert
critiques, and the Yates Memo was the product of a working group of
DOJ lawyers convened to consider how to improve the DOJ's approach
to corporate misconduct.13 8 According to this view, the Memo adopted
(at least in part) a better approach to achieve widely shared utilitarian
goals, supplemented by pragmatic procedural policies.
It is noteworthy that Deputy Attorney General Yates did not
mention these expert arguments; instead she spoke of public opinion
that may "incorrectly" condemn the DOJ, even when it is doing "a bangup job."139 Public opinion polls consistently showed broad support for
more prosecutions after the 2008 financial crisis. 1 4 0 The majority of the

public-seventy-nine percent in one survey-wanted prosecutors to
find the people who were responsible for the financial crash and send
them to jail. 141
There are two problems with a shift in public policy to address the
public's demand for more individual liability. First, as Yates-and many
critics of the DOJ-have noted, even when criminal conduct has
occurred in the corporate setting, it is difficult to bring successful

137. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 127, at 1793 (discussing Judge Rakoffs view that
"prosecutors are too quick to settle corporate cases on lenient terms after hasty investigations,"
and that "prosecuting individuals would be more effective than 'imposing internal compliance
measures that are often little more than window-dressing'").
138. Yates Remarks May 10, 2016, supra note 131.
139. Yates Remarks Sept. 10, 2015, supra note 130.
140. See Will Dobbs-Allsopp, 'Too Big to Jail' on Trial in Court of Public Opinion, MORNING
CONSULT (Apr. 6, 2015), https://morningconsult.com/2 015/04/too-big-to-jail-on-trial-in-court-ofpublic-opinion/ (reporting that '[fifty-eight percent of voters surveyed said sending [more
executives] to jail would deter Wall Street firms from committing financial crimes" and forty-four
percent said fines would be ineffective); Quigley, supra note 128, at 128-29 (noting several polls).
141. Quigley, supra note 128, at 128-29 n.148. Many press accounts quote members of the
public expressing these views. See, e.g., Charles Gasparino, Why Nobody Went to jail, N.Y. POST
(Mar. 1, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2011/03/01/why-nobody-went-to-jail/ (describing
the public desire to identify the villains and put people in jail). One interesting poll found that
respondents earning more than $100,000 per year had the highest level of support for sending
high-level employees to jail. Dobbs-Allsopp, supra note 140.
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prosecutions against individuals. 142 Second, it is questionable how
much of the conduct that led to the 2008 crisis can be properly called
criminal, rather than actionable solely under civil law theories. A recent
case provides a good example of the difficulty of proving even civil
liability on the part of individuals for conduct during the financial
crisis. The Second Circuit reversed Judge Jed Rakoffs decision imposing
civil penalties over $1.2 billion on Countrywide Home Loans, Bank of
America, and Rebecca Mairone. 143
The appellate decision is significant for two reasons. First, the
decision interprets the mail and wire fraud statutes restrictively,
holding that as a matter of law it is insufficient for the Government to
prove that the defendants sold mortgages "they knew were not of the
quality promised in their contracts." 144 The court held that it is
necessary to demonstrate "contemporaneous fraudulent intent" to
"prove a scheme to defraud through contractual promises." 145 Under
this interpretation, a wider range of conduct constitutes merely a
breach of contract, not fraud, on the part of either corporate entities or
individuals. Second, the decision reversed one of the very few cases in
which an individual had been liable-even civilly-for faulty loans. 146
Recall that Judge Rakoff, whose decision was reversed, has been a
sharp critic of the DOJ's failure to prosecute individuals. 14 7 The reversal
of his decision to impose even civil liability-if it standsdemonstrates just how hard it might be to impose criminal liability.
These difficulties are not something the public is likely to
understand. 148
This raises an intriguing question: in a democratic system, how
much should prosecutorial policy reflect public opinion? In the United
States, prosecution is an executive function and, as a structural matter,
it is subject to direct or indirect political accountability. 149 What are the

142. Yates Remarks May 10, 2016, supra note 131. See also Garrett, supra note 127, at 1823-38
(discussing the obstacles in prosecuting individuals for corporate crimes).
143. United States ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 652-53
(2d. Cir. 2016).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 653, 660-62.
146. Id. at 653.
147. See Rakoff, supra note 129 (discussing the failure of federal prosecutors to prosecute
high-level executives).
148.

See generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL CRIMES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA'S

CORPORATE AGE (2016) (explaining that business crime is seldom black and white and attempting
to fill gap in American's understanding).
149. In the States, the accountability is generally direct, through prosecutorial elections. In the
federal system, it is indirect: the leadership of the DOJ, including the U.S. Attorneys, is made up of
political appointees nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. For a discussion of
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limits of that accountability? What if there is strong public support for
some policies that the criminal justice experts believe to be unjustified
and perhaps counterproductive? 5 0 Most people get their information
about the criminal justice system from the news media-which
provides a distorted view 5 1-thus public opinion about criminal
justice policies may be based on misunderstanding and lack of
knowledge. 152 Members of the public might shift their views if they had
more information. In an experimental setting, when subjects were
provided with additional information, many changed their views on
criminal justice issues. 153 In the absence of such information, how much
weight should the public's views be given?

political accountability for prosecutorial discretion in the U.S. system, and a comparison to the
French and German systems, see Sara Sun Beale, Prosecutorial Discretion in Three Systems:
Balancing Conflicting Goals and Providing Mechanisms for Control, in DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT ch. 3 (Michele Caianiello & Jacqueline S. Hodgson, eds., 2015)
(comparing and contrasting the functions of a prosecutor's role and the distinctive hiring
practices and training of prosecutors in the three countries that lead to the varying differences in
the amount of political accountability and prosecutorial discretion).
150. One example is the divergence between expert and lay opinion on the efficacy of
increasing punishment to increase deterrence and reduce crime. Although members of the public
generally assume that more punishment will translate into reduction in crime rates, in reviewing
the available studies, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the deterrent effect is
limited and diminishes sharply as punishments increase. See generally COMMITTEE ON LAW AND
JUSTICE, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

155 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & F. Stevens Redburn eds., 2014) (concluding that "the
evidence base demonstrates that lengthy prison sentences are ineffective as a crime control
measure," and "the incremental deterrent effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest
at best"). For a discussion of the differences between the lay public and expert views of criminal
justice policy and the role that cognitive errors may play in shaping lay views, see Sara Sun Beale,
What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 47-51, 57-64
(1997) (discussing research finding manner in which media frames news can increase fear of
crime and its salience to the public, and describing cognitive errors that distort public's views of
crime).
151. See generally Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on CriminalJustice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006) (describing the
variance between the increasing rate of media coverage of violent crimes versus the declining
number of murder rates and how media distorted the public's opinion).
152. See, e.g., Barry Mitchell & Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing for Murder: Exploring Public
Knowledge and Public Opinion in England and Wales, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 141, 145-55 (2011)
(describing a survey finding public misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about murder
sentencing).
153. Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influence on Public Views of Sentencing,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 560-64 (1990). See also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic:
Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 176-77 (2011)
(describing research finding participants in deliberative polling moved toward greater leniency
after small group discussions).
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V. CONCLUSION
As noted above, Justice Holmes famously stated that the life of the
law is experience rather than logic, and it must respond to the "felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious." 15 4 The Yates Memo
attempts to adapt the DOJ's utilitarian and pragmatic approach to
corporate criminal liability in light of our contemporary experience and
the "felt necessities of the time," while also responding to the public's
"intuitions" of public policy.

154.

Supra text accompanying note 48.

